Afghan Initiative

An Afghan-led initiative for a Permanent, Sustainable Peace Settlement in Afghanistan and Durable Stability in the Wider Region

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan will begin in July 2011 and to be completed in 2014. However, the prospects of a lasting peace in Afghanistan still remain murky at the very least, and a clear vision of a peaceful Afghan future seems as distant a prospect as it was when the first NATO soldier stepped on Afghan soil in 2001.

The key ingredient to a lasting peace in Afghanistan has to be “the Afghan element” which has so far been tragically absent from the Afghan scene. There is an urgent need to bring an “Afghan element” into the Afghan peace-making process. This includes an initiative for permanent peace and stability in Afghanistan and the wider region initiated by the Movement for Peaceful Transformation of Afghanistan (MPTA), formed over a year ago by prominent neutral Afghans to seek an Afghan solution to the Afghan problem.

The MPTA strategy understands the US need for its longstanding involvement in the region. A successful implementation of the MPTA strategy will, indeed, give a new, positive definition to the US involvement in this part of the world.

The US invaded Afghanistan in 2001 without clearly stated political goals or preparation. The speed of the initial military victory over the Taliban led to a degree of complacency in the initial stages of the invasion. The Bonn agreement was a victor’s peace attended by Washington's Afghan allies, who carved up the post-war status quo between them. The US displayed little knowledge of the culture and history of the Afghan people; especially the Pashtuns who constitute the majority of the country’s population that were side-lined in Bonn. Pashtun history has been marked by fierce resistance to foreign invasions. The US supported the Afghans in their fight against the Soviet occupation, but made the mistake of immediately abandoning Afghanistan. This contributed directly to the resulting civil war, the emergence of the Taliban and the use of Afghan territory by Al Qaeda.

The current US troop withdrawal is inevitable for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that the US cannot send more troops to Afghanistan and continue to inject huge financial resources for many decades to come. NATO member states are also increasingly reluctant to send more troops and resources to Afghanistan. The current Afghan war stands the risk of morphing into an “American war”, as opposed to its current billing of “the international community’s fight against terrorism”. Additionally, the Afghan war poses risks to the very existence of NATO.

However, there seems to be no easy way out of the current crisis in Afghanistan for NATO, in general, and the US, in particular. What has been missing until now is unambiguous US commitment to negotiation.

Part of the current chaos in Afghanistan has been a long and sustained US reliance on warlords, human rights abusers, corrupt officials and drug traffickers. The US thought these figures were representing their communities and would mobilize the nation to serve the US interests. This proved wrong, severely undermining the US efforts in Afghanistan, and sharply diminishing any hope of a truly peaceful and stable Afghanistan, as hoped by Afghans.

In addition, the Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to be a factional army, loyal to patron warlords rather than being loyal to the country, the Afghan Constitution, and the President of Afghanistan. The Afghan army lacks a purpose or ideology to fight for. The ANA fights for money; it is a ‘native mercenary’. The increase in numbers and better equipment will not make the ANA a more competent army, fully capable of shouldering the responsibility of security in Afghanistan beyond 2014. There seem little prospects for the ANA being able to successfully defend the country against the Taliban independently of the US physical military support. Army is part of the government, not the opposite. If the government is corrupt and good-for-nothing, how its army can be good.

Similarly, corruption at all levels of government in Kabul has fed warlords and insurgency. Indeed, the continuation of a corrupt government in Kabul would lead to another insurgency even if some form of peace and stability is achieved through the current efforts.

There has been no major success in the battleground so far: The nearly half a million well-trained and well-equipped NATO and Afghan soldiers have not been able to crush the resistance. Instead, the Taliban have increased their influence. Until two years ago NATO experts thought the Taliban were confined only to Pashtun-dominated areas. Now, the Taliban are also active in northern Afghanistan where Pashtuns are not in majority. The Taliban is now a nationwide resistance movement. Until two years ago, many Afghans thought NATO was to help Afghanistan; but today few believe the same, including the president and high-ranking Afghan government officials.

The US-Karzai relationship is increasingly worsening, without any prospects of improvement. The Americans believe Karzai has “no clear vision” for the country, is "not an adequate strategic partner", had not done enough to improve governance "since day one, sparking crisis after crisis and to be "manic-depressive". On the other side, Karzai openly criticises the NATO member states, especially the US and UK, for promoting corruption, the narcotics business, and weakening the central government. He brands implicitly the NATO as an occupying force and a major source of instability not only in Afghanistan, but also for the whole region. Karzai accuses the Americans for being in Afghanistan only to advance their own interests, humiliating him and blackmailing his ministers and other high-ranking government officials. He accuses NATO of creating ethnic rifts and running parallel government structures in Afghanistan. Karzai believes that NATO's counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies were both failing and made it clear that he no longer trusted the United States, its representatives, or their advice.

Some American experts think, the US-led NATO commitment in money and troops in Afghanistan is neither feasible, nor sustainable and their sacrifice is no more for a just cause either. The US has 100,000 troops and spends over $10 billion a month in war in Afghanistan. In addition, the over $20 billion spent ostensibly on the reconstruction in the past 10 years has gained little on the ground. The list goes on:

  • By imposing corrupt officials, drug traffickers and human rights abusers on the Afghan nation, NATO has dashed the success of democracy in Afghanistan. The farcical nature of the last presidential and parliamentary elections is self-evident.
  • The names Guantanamo, Bagram and other US official and private prisons mean nothing but shame. Their existence goes against all international laws and has seriously affected the US human rights record.
  • No major reconstruction projects have been implemented in the past 10 years in spite of loud promises from George Bush and Tony Blair. President Karzai has openly complained about this shortcoming on the part of the International Community. The U.S.-backed stabilization programs have had limited success in kick-starting the domestic economy. Karzai has accused the international community that the aid program has made Afghanistan dependent upon other nations. Foreign aid is widely perceived by high government officials as nurturing extortion, corruption and incompetent administration of basic services.
  • The Afghans thought that NATO, led by US, would stop the interference of the neighbouring countries in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Such interference has not only did not stop, but has increased. These neighbours, once US allies in toppling the Taliban regime, are now working against the US presence in the region. They want to force the US-led NATO to leave Afghanistan humiliated.

The ground reality indicates that the US cannot win the Afghan war only by military means. There is need for a political solution, though the US often finds it difficult to talk to its enemies, but that's how insurgencies end.

However, there still is an opportunity for the US and NATO to achieve positive results and to conclude the Afghan mission without the humiliation that currently seems most probable. Instead of pursuing a fruitless fixation with military supremacy, the U.S. and its allies should concentrate on achieving a political deal, which means sitting down with Taliban, no matter how distasteful that may seem. The US must leave Afghanistan with a clear and well-calculated strategy. Leaving a mess behind will not only harm the Afghans and their neighbours, but the West as well. It will force the US to come back to clean the mess, albeit with a much greater cost, which the US may or may not be able to afford.

The way forward requires a clear US strategy to ensure the security of Afghanistan and the region, based on a sustainable settlement in Afghanistan, which will potentially ease the constraints in relation to the US strategic reach in terms of the revolutions in the Middle East. A successful implementation of this strategy will give a new, positive definition to the US leadership in this part of the world. To do so, there is a need to create a viable and trusted partner government in Kabul that can assume the responsibility of the internal security and defence of Afghanistan after 2014. Key steps need to be taken in this direction by the US during the transitional 2011-2014 period if the goal is to be reached.

The U.S. field commanders believe the surge has weakened the Taliban and that the resulting military pressure has led to opportunities for peace talks. Well-founded or not, this belief is giving momentum for peace. The US is increasingly recognising the Taliban as the principal party to the conflict and is starting to take them seriously. This presents an opportunity in terms of paving the way for a new and inclusive internal settlement. However, we believe that there is an urgent need for a transitional administration in Afghanistan. This is the basis of MPTA proposal, which we believe can lead to a viable government, guaranteeing sustainable peace and permanent stability in Afghanistan and in the region.

The Taliban, on the other hand, also need to negotiate and come to terms with International Community. The Taliban need to realize that:

  • All wars are followed by a process of negotiations and the current war in Afghanistan is no exception. MPTA has tailored a specific programme to convince the Taliban that it is time for them to negotiate.

The Taliban also need to be assured that:

  • NATO and the west recognise that the Afghan problem cannot be solved without the Taliban’s active participation. The Taliban can help the US in safe and honourable exit.
  • the US is willing to:
    1. remove their names from the black list;
    2. withdraw prizes on their head;
    3. release their prisoners as a good will gesture for negotiations.
  • Negotiating a peace settlement will improve the Taliban’s image and position inside and outside Afghanistan.
  • It is the national and religious responsibility of the Taliban to talk.
  • Negotiations are a good exit strategy for Taliban as they cannot continue a bloody war for ever. The Taliban's problem with NATO is the presence of foreign troops on their soil. The troop withdrawal process can bring the Taliban to the negotiation process.

The MPTA proposal takes the notion of the Afghan peace further than currently envisioned. We believe that without taking an Afghan-produced solution structure on board, the International Community will repeat the chaotic experience of post-Soviet withdrawal era in Afghanistan and the mistakes made in Bonn. Negotiation must turn into a viable exit strategy for all sides which in turn guarantees permanent peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Difficulties with proposed plan for power-sharing between the current Kabul regime and the Taliban.

We see great potential for the notion of power-sharing to implode.

Some of the obstacles in the path of an honourable exit, transition and peaceful settlement include:

  • Power-sharing with the Taliban would put into question the legitimacy of the Taliban’s overthrow by coalition forces. Some radical, conservative and religious Americans are likely to oppose it.
  • For the Afghan Government, power sharing would mean that they were “beating the drum” of others for the past 10 years, and were wrong calling their fellow citizens, the Taliban, ‘terrorists’.
  • Power-sharing for the Taliban would mean abandoning a firm ideology and the logic of resistance.
  • A simple power sharing will humiliate the Afghan Government, the Taliban and NATO in the eyes of the Afghans because it will pose the legitimate question of how and why the two opposing sides could suddenly sit and solve their problems now, and not few years ago. To avoid resistance from some factions within warring parties who could not accept a power-sharing arrangement because they would feel humiliated and would therefore breakaway from any peace agreement, the MPTA has devised a detailed transitional arrangement.
  • The warlords, human right abusers, corrupt officials and drug traffickers, who control the current Afghan Government, do not want peace. The US and NATO member states used these elements for their own ends, but these elements also successfully used the US and NATO for their personal, ethnic and group interests for the last 10 years. They wish to continue this honeymoon for as long as they can. These parasites enjoyed unlimited power and received a huge amount of the NATO member states taxpayers’ money. They are reluctant to embrace peace and lose power and money.
  • The continuation of war will keep the parasites not only in power and blocking peace and democracy, but also protect them from prosecution.
  • The more war continues the more extremists will be produced, trained and get control of the events. These well-trained people with sense of revenge can destabilise with their acts of sabotage, suicide, etc., any future government, the region and can be used in other parts of the world.
  • The High Peace Council (HPC) is (a) an address for the Afghan Government to negotiate with Taliban, (b) responsible for re-integration to weaken the Taliban and (c) mediate for reconciliation. The HPC big problem is its broad mandate adopted for itself. As the government address for negotiation and an entity to weaken the Taliban, it is not in the position to mediate and reconcile. This is why the peace council is failing to find those it should hold peace talks with. Negotiations so far have failed to engage any senior Taliban figures and most of the talks so far have been with inconsequential groups. Even, its re-integration program has failed as some of those who have surrendered were never in fact insurgents, but instead were individuals trying to take advantage of a package of incentives offered by the government to those who turn in their weapons. Due to its composition and history, HPC is part of the conflict and thus can only be the government’s address; it cannot be a mediator. HPC currently trying to do all three contradictory jobs at a time. The armed opposition has already rejected the HPC role as mediator. Until and unless the HPC insists on its role as mediator, it will be a major obstacle to any comprehensive peace solution.
  • An exclusively UN-mediated, or non-Afghan third party, peace initiative is very unlikely to work. Many Afghans will see such an attempt as yet another one in a long line of attempts by outsiders to control Afghans’ future. As a result many Afghans and their neighbours are likely to act openly or covertly against this strategy, resulting in a proxy war along ethnic lines in Afghanistan and elsewhere, especially between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan.

We propose the following steps:

  • It is essential that a group of respected and neutral Afghans, such as The Movement for Peaceful Transformation of Afghanistan develops and pursues an initiative to mediate between the Kabul Government/HPC and the Taliban. The OIC and UN must extend their support to such an Afghan initiative.
  • Having an Afghan address for the armed opposition is an urgent necessity. Such an address for the Taliban will:
  1. Give them an open channel for transparent face-to-face interaction, discussions, dialogue and negotiations. It will bring several reconciliation efforts that are currently underway into one channel. It will help to avoid future potential embarrassment such as that of Akhtar Mohammad Mansur, a shopkeeper posed as a Taliban Number Two. It will facilitate effective communication through a mediator between the Afghan Government and the Taliban.
  2. Eliminate dangerous confusion. Many different groups carry out various acts of violence across Afghanistan and most of these acts are attributed to the Taliban. Some of them are not Taliban, but misuse their identity for their own criminal or political purposes. A clear address and representation of the Taliban can put an end to such mix-ups.
  3. Facilitate urgently needed aid to Taliban-held areas. Schools and clinics are closed in areas under the Taliban control. An address and negotiation will encourage and put pressure on the Taliban to allow humanitarian assistance to be delivered to the people.
  4. If the Taliban are allowed to have an address with proper treatment, they can then be held responsible for their specific behaviour and an explanation demanded for their actions.
  5. An address and direct contact with Taliban will answer many questions currently unanswered in the mind of the International Community, e.g. what are their policies for education, women rights, relations with extremist groups, etc. Crucially, it will answer the question as to the kind of Afghanistan in which the Taliban aspire to live.

Where should this address be? The best option is inside Afghanistan for which MPTA has specific proposal. Inside address will give the Taliban more freedom of expression and decision making. It will give a privilege to the Kabul Government and NATO that the Taliban could live in their controlled area without fear accepting the country’s constitution, law and regulations.

  • The formation of a transitional government agreed by all stakeholders, mainly the Afghan Government and the Taliban. It will give way to a new Afghan Government based on steps proposed by MPTA. There is need for a mechanism to support the Transition arrangements, for example, for the US, preferably under a UN mandate, to act to enforce the mechanisms.
  • The MPTA proposal understands the US needs to maintain, after its combat mission ends, a long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Here, the U.S. presence, according to the MPTA proposal, will be more of a traditional diplomatic and foreign assistance role and provide a road map for mutual political, economic and security cooperation.
  • The resulting new Afghan Government, based on the MPTA proposal, will need to assure the neighbours of Afghanistan that their legitimate interests are to be taken on board. However, Afghanistan cannot be viewed as their “strategic asset”. The UN has to guarantee such arrangement and non-interference.

Afghanistan is a victim of its neighbors’ interference, started by the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, some of Afghanistan’s neighbors are bitter rivals to each other. As yet they do not see themselves as having a common interest in peace in Afghanistan; the engagement of Afghanistan’s neighbors in Afghan affairs has often acted simply to ratchet up competition between them. Pakistan's internal crisis is getting worse and after the death of Osama Bin Laden the US pressure on Pakistan has increased. Pakistan may not be able to support the armed opposition to the extent it has done in the past. Indian support of ethnic minorities in Afghanistan has given free hand to Pakistan to work in Pashtun majority. Thus, India and Pakistan make their Kashmir’s chess game in Afghanistan - far away from their common borders. Iran also seems not sincere for peace in Afghanistan for many reasons. However, it may also not enjoy for long the International Community’s blind eye towards its improper behavior. It is true that no country in the world has gained so much as Iran has done from the US ‘war on terror’, which has in turn made many Afghans and Arab Gulf States suspicious of covert US cooperation with Iran.

Neither the Afghans nor the International Community can be held hostage forever by those internal and external forces who do not want peace and stability in Afghanistan. These forces can be brought to the right track if there is a wise strategy for exit and transition.

The UN credibility as a neutral body and as an independent apparatus for peace in Afghanistan has been severely compromised over the past 30 years. The Bonn Conference concluded by UN brought little security, little reconstruction and little good governance to Afghanistan. The UN would be more successful if it gave an opportunity to the Afghans and support the MPTA initiative for a peace settlement in Afghanistan.

An Afghan initiative for a strong government in Afghanistan having trustful relations with Afghan neighbors and International Community is the most appropriate and practical solution for Afghanistan. MPTA has worked on such a formula and mechanism for its enforcement.

For more information, please contact:

Dr Wasi Qani,

Head, Cultural & Press Deptt, MPTA

Tel. (Afghanistan): 0787105925, 0703550080




The President of Afghanistan (based on Article 64 of the Afghan Constitution), or the United Nations, or the Organization for Islamic Conference, or any other alternative body with necessary sanctioning powers, should convene the traditional Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly), to pave way for a political solution to the current Afghan crisis.

A group of credible, committed and non-aligned Afghans must be given opportunity to form a third-party intermediary force, ‘Peace Delegation’. The Peace Delegation mediates between the Afghan Government and the armed opposition and prepares ground for direct and unconditional peace talks. Such talks will lead to a permanent peace in Afghanistan and to coordinate global and regional interests with the interests of the Afghans.

The Movement for Peaceful Transformation of Afghanistan (MPTA) has the required experience to assume the role of the ‘Peace Delegation’. Dr Farouq Azam, Chairman of MPTA, a well-respected Afghan, has extensive experience in mediating among warring factions in tough war conditions. His mediation among different warring groups in Afghanistan during 1993-94 and his active diplomacy in contacting regional powers to help stability is still fresh in the minds of many Afghans. His mediation between Saudi Arabia and the Taliban in 1998 acknowledges his internationally recognized expertise as mediator. His recent meetings with President Karzai and the High Peace Council, the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami leaders is a clear indication Dr Azam has easy access to all parties concerned in the Afghan conflict. This easy access, widely respected position and skills of negotiation are valuable assets invested in MPTA to be utilized for bringing peace in war-torn Afghanistan. The MPTA, after consulting thousands of Afghans and non-Afghans inside and outside Afghanistan, has developed the following formula to shape a negotiated settlement acceptable to all parties concerned.

This formula preserves what is gained in the past 10 years, serves the vital interests of the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people for today and their future generations and takes on board the legitimate interests of the regional and global powers.

Based on the above aims and objectives, the following steps are recommended:

Preliminary Steps

1 - The creation of ‘Peace Delegation’.

As a first step, President Karzai or on his behalf the High Peace Council asks the MPTA to mediate between the Afghan Government and the armed opposition. After received green light from AG/HPC for mediation, MPTA forms ‘Peace Delegation’ to contact the armed opposition and secure similar sign of go ahead.

2 - Trust building.

As the second step, ‘Peace Delegation’ works towards the creation of an atmosphere of trust building between the Afghan Government and the armed opposition, leading to an agreement by both sides to commence formal talks. This will, in turn, culminate in the following fundamental steps:

A: The cessation of all propaganda by the opposing sides against each other, and the replacing of any negative rhetoric with gestures of peace and reconciliation.

B: The release of some political prisoners by the Afghan Government as a good will gesture.

C: The removal from black list, as a good will gesture, the names of some opposition members, and the lifting of the prizes and rewards for information leading to their capture or killing.

3 - Commencing Direct Talks

A: Direct and unconditional talks. With the assistance and mediation of the ‘Peace Delegation’, direct and unconditional talks shall begin between the Afghan Government and the authoritative representatives of the armed opposition.

B: Inter-Afghan Conference. An agreement regarding the creation of an Inter-Afghan Conference shall be reached during these talks.

C: Address for opposition. There is an urgent and pressing need for the Afghan armed opposition to have an address, similar to the recently-created High Peace Council as the address for Afghan Government. The most convenient location for an address for the Afghan armed opposition, for the purpose of practicality and expediting the peace process, would be inside Afghanistan but in Kabul. Helmand province can be a candidate location or any other province mutually agreed. A new provincial governor shall be appointed by the Afghan President based on the recommendation of the Delegation for Peace. The new governor will function based on the Afghan Constitution and government’s rules and regulations, but will be independent in his work. The Afghan Government, NATO and Afghan armed opposition shall agree that they shall not undertake any military activities in the province, nor use it as a base for military activities against any other Afghan provinces. The Helmand province, if agreed upon, shall become the Afghan “home of peace”, and the focal point of any peace-bringing negotiations. Government personnel and armed opposition members must co-exist, unarmed, in this “home of peace” with total confidence, and without having to face any threats. The international community will assist with development and reconstruction projects in Helmand through the newly-formed provincial administration. The new administration will appoint qualified staff, preventing administrative corruption and drug production, and maintain security.

4 - Inter-Afghan Conference:

A: An Inter-Afghan Conference is to be convened in the Afghan “home of peace” by the Delegation for Peace with the assistance of the OIC and the UN.

B: Those taking part in the Inter-Afghan Conference include representatives of the Afghan Government, representatives of the armed opposition, the civil society, as well as peace-seeking political, social, religious and intellectual personalities of Afghanistan.

C: The Inter-Afghan Conference determines such issues as the date, the place, number of delegates, the nature, the standards, and the mechanism for inviting delegates to the Loya Jirga.

D: The Inter-Afghan Conference appoints the Loya Jirga Committee, an authoritative committee for calling the Loya Jirga.

E: The Inter-Afghan Conference reaches an agreement on the release of all political prisoners and removing all black lists prior to the convening of the Loya Jirga.

F: The creation of Ceasefire Commission to announce, implement and observe ceasefire between the Afghan Government/NATO and the armed opposition, in approaching and during the meeting of Loya Jirga.

Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly)

The Establishment of Loya Jirga and its Decisions

A: The Loya Jirga is to be convened by the Loya Jirga Committee with the assistance of MPTA, OIC and UN, marking the end of the Afghan war.

B: Participation in the Loya Jirga will based on a proportional representation of all Afghan ethnic groups, the different religious and social strata, warring factions, civil society, and any other relevant groups.

C: In order to bring permanent peace, create an independent, stable, united and progressive Afghanistan, the Loya Jirga will make necessary changes to the current Afghan Constitution.

D: The Loya Jirga appoints an authoritative commission for the purpose of the interpretation of the Constitution in order to avoid any potential uncertainty or ambivalence arising.

E: The Loya Jirga determines the foreign troops’ withdrawal schedule and mechanism for the implementation of the decision in this regard, including OIC peacekeeping force, if deemed necessary, to replace NATO troops.

F: The Loya Jirga determines fundamental issues such as those pertaining to the future Afghan president, the future parliament, provincial and district councils, and the dates and mechanisms for the appointment of the above.

G: The Loya Jirga appoints a new leader to the country for a certain period. The current president will transfer all powers, in the presence of the Loya Jirga, to the newly-appointed president who shall in turn take oath of allegiance to the Constitution.

H: After offering its allegiance to the new president, the Loya Jirga departs, and will be replaced by a Loya Jirga-appointed Provisional Afghan Parliament comprised of three representatives from each province that will include a religious leader, a tribal leader and a technocrat. The new Afghan President will introduce his newly-appointed cabinet, Provisional Government, to the Provisional Afghan Parliament for approval.

The Provisional Government

A: The Provisional Government is committed to a united Afghanistan, and is composed of qualified non-aligned professionals.

B: The Provisional Government is not a government of alliances; its head and members do not belong to any particular Afghan party or group; nor would it represent the interests of a foreign country, or countries; nor shall it seek enmity with any Afghan group, any country in the region, or beyond.

C: The Provisional Government authority is not in the domain or against any particular Afghan group or a country, but solely devoted to the protection of the Afghan national interests.

D: The Provisional Government is committed not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other country, nor will allow its soils to be used against other countries. Rather, Afghanistan plays a constructive role in the stability and development of the region and that of the world as a whole.

E: The neighboring countries make commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The UN Security Council is to guarantee such commitment and imposes sanctions on those who violate this covenant.

F: Afghanistan, as an independent country, is an active member of the international community. The international community respects Afghan independence, recognizes and supports the Provisional Government.

G: The Afghan Provisional Government introduces a five-year plan for the development and stability of the country. The international community is committed to the future development of Afghanistan and continues its economic assistance to the country.

H: Foreign forces withdraw from Afghanistan based on the adopted time-table. NATO continues to provide the necessary support for Afghan security forces. Afghan security forces will, however, need to be self-reliant in terms of the ability to provide internal security and defend the country.

I: The Provisional Government, with the assistance of the UN and OIC, will strive to create conducive conditions for the return of Afghan refugees from both Iran and Pakistan, and those that have been internally displaced.

J: The Provisional Government collects all heavy weapons and allowing light arms with legal permits only. All foreign fighters, currently fighting in the ranks of armed opposition, depart Afghanistan. Those foreigners who wish to remain in Afghanistan will be dealt with as refugees based on Afghan government regulations, 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees, and other international laws.

K: Afghanistan is a member of OIC and with its help forms a forum of eminent foreign and Afghan Islamic scholars to advise the Provisional Government, in the light of Islamic jurisprudence, in relation to important issues such as female education, woman rights, Hijab, the attainment of modern education, the protection Afghanistan’s cultural heritage, etc.

L: The Provisional Government, based on the provisions of the Afghan Constitution, and with assistance from the UN and OIC, will fulfill its mission in relation to the election of the Afghan President, the parliament, the provincial and district councils, and will cede authority to the newly-elected President.

M: The President, the ministers, the higher judges, and the attorney-general of the Provisional Afghan Government cannot work as president, minister, the higher judge, and the attorney-general in the newly-elected administration that will replace the Provisional Government.

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